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Abstract
We exploit time variation in the degree of development of local credit markets and
matched workers-¯rm data with workers histories to asses the role of the ¯rm as an
internal loans market. By tilting the workers wage-tenure pro¯le around their tenure-
productivity pro¯le the ¯rm can generate borrowing °ows from workers to the ¯rm
(when the earnings pro¯le is steeper than the productivity pro¯le) or vice versa from
the ¯rm to the workers (when the earnings pro¯le is °atter) thus compensating for the
imperfect functioning of the loans market. We ¯nd that ¯rms located in less ¯nancially
developed areas o®er wages that are lower at the beginning of tenure and higher at
the end than those o®ered by ¯rms in more ¯nancially developed markets, which helps
¯rms ¯nance their operations by raising funds from workers. This e®ect does not re-
°ect unobserved local factors that systematically a®ect wage tenure pro¯les, since we
control for local market e®ects and only exploit variation time variation in the degree
of local ¯nancial development induced by e®ects of exogenous liberalization. The credit
generated by implicit lending within the ¯rm is economically important and can be
as large as 30% of bank lending. Implicit contracts help more those ¯rms that have
a problematic access to the loans market and funds come more from workers with a
stronger willingness to lend. Consistent with credit market imperfections opening a
trade opportunity within the ¯rm we ¯nd that the internal rate of return of implicit
loans lies between the rate at which workers savings are remunerated and the rate ¯rms
pay on their loans from banks.
JEL Classi¯cation: J3,L2,G3
Keywords: Implicit contracts, ¯nancial frictions, tenure pro¯le, wage setting.
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11 Introduction
In an economy with frictions the ¯rm ceases to be merely a place where production
occurs. The pooling of assets and human capital, besides allowing production of goods and
services, naturally creates a "market" where implicit labor contracts can be designed to
redistribute factor rewards across states or over time, partially overcoming the consequences
of imperfect insurance and ¯nancial markets. In the implicit contract literature, di®erences
in preferences for risk makes it optimal for risk neutral entrepreneurs to o®er insurance
to risk averse workers (Knight 1921, Baily 1974, Azariadis 1975). In this setting ¯rms
e®ectively smooth workers' consumption across states when insurance markets fail to work,
for instance because of the intrinsic moral hazard that labor income risk entails. In a similar
spirit, the wage contract may re°ect opportunities to redistribute factor rewards across time
when access to the credit market is limited or too costly. By tilting the wage-tenure pro¯le
relative to its frictionless counterpart, the payment of wages over the life of an employer-
employee relation can be front-loaded or back-loaded, thus making funds available to the
party - the ¯rm or the worker - that currently needs them the most.
This paper focuses on the role of the ¯rm as an implicit credit market and tests how
credit frictions in local credit markets are re°ected in the wage contract that ¯rms and
workers agree upon. The key idea is that the relative easiness in the access to credit should
be re°ected in the shape (slope and location) of the wage-tenure pro¯le. If ¯rms have
easier access to the loans market than their workers and/or are less in need of cash (e.g.,
because they are well endowed with collateral, can produce hard information, can - more
easily than workers - establish repeated relationships with their lenders), they can lend
implicitly to their workers by o®ering a wage pro¯le that, over the workers' tenure with the
¯rm, is °atter than the pro¯le that the same workers would face in a frictionless world. In
this case, thanks to the greater information that the ¯rm has about workers' productivity
compared to the market, it is as if the ¯rm were borrowing on behalf of the worker and
helping him smooth consumption over time. This is the case examined by Azariadis (1988),
who studies a setting where, due to extreme adverse selection, workers are excluded from
the loans market while ¯rms have perfect access to it. Since wage promises, as re°ected in
the wage tenure pro¯le, are not enforceable, what makes it possible for lending within the
¯rm to take place is human capital speci¯city, which makes workers unlikely to leave the¯rm before repayment.
Implicit lending opportunities need not be limited to the case of workers borrowing
from the ¯rm. After all, ¯rms even more than workers are users of capital to ¯nance their
investment plans and ¯rms too may have limited access to the ¯nancial market, as a large
literature on ¯rm borrowing constraints suggests (Hubbard 1998, Stein & Center 2003).
Michelacci & Quadrini (2009) study this case and show that a credit-constrained ¯rm can
at least partly make up for the shortage of capital by reshaping the workers' wage contract
relative to its frictionless equivalent. In particular, the ¯rm may be paying their workers
less at the beginning of their tenure and more towards the end, resulting in a steeper wage
pro¯le relative to the case in which access to credit is unimpeded. In this setting too makes
the contracts self-enforceable is worker-speci¯c human capital, which limits ¯rms' incentives
to ¯re a worker that has lent implicitly to the ¯rm.
To test the role of the ¯rm as an internal credit market and establish in what direction
implicit credit °ows, we use two sources of data. First, we rely on matched Italian lon-
gitudinal ¯rm-employees data. The data report workers' wages and employment histories
over a long span of time (1974-1997) allowing to recover tenure and experience pro¯les.
Second, we exploit systematic di®erences in ¯nancial development across local markets and
exogenous changes in these di®erences induced by ¯nancial market liberalization during the
1990s. Under the well grounded assumption that ¯rms, particularly small ones, and a for-
tiori workers, can only borrow locally (Petersen & Rajan 2002), workers and ¯rms' ability
to borrow in the market are directly tied to the degree of local credit market development.
Variation in the latter should then be re°ected in the slope and location of the wage pro¯le
over the worker's tenure with the ¯rm. In particular, we construct an index of ¯nancial
market backwardness as the "excess" spread (between loan rates and deposit rates) that a
given ¯rm faces in its local credit market relative to what an observationally equivalent ¯rm
would face in the most developed local credit market at the start of the process of ¯nancial
market liberalization and in each subsequent year. We then attach each worker-¯rm relation
the degree of backwardness in their local credit market at time tenure with the ¯rms starts
and use a two-step estimation strategy to identify the shifts in the slope and intercept of
the wage-tenure pro¯le as the degree of ¯nancial development varies over time and spatially
across local markets. We ¯nd that wage pro¯les are steeper and have a lower intercept when
¯rms face a less developed local credit market, which is consistent with the hypothesis the
3workers lend implicitly to their ¯rms.
To give a sense of the magnitudes involved, we calculate that the entry wage of a worker
matched with a ¯rm located in the median developed credit market is 36 percent lower than
that of a (observationally equivalent) worker matched with a (observationally equivalent)
¯rm located in the most developed local credit market. Moreover, we calculate that her
wage would grow at a rate that is 0.66 percent faster for each month of tenure. This implies
that a typical worker will be lending to the ¯rm for about 55 months (4.5 years) before
starting to be "paid back".
These implicit wage contractual di®erences can generate substantial °ows of funds from
workers to ¯rms. A representative ¯rm located in the median developed credit market
raises from workers as much funds as 11 percent of what it gets from banks. This share
increases to 30 percent for a ¯rm located in a market at the 75th percentile of our index of
¯nancial market backwardness. Our estimates of the internal rates of return of these implicit
loans range between 2 and 5 percent, depending on the degree of ¯nancial development.
Interestingly, these rates sit always between the rate on deposits (an measure of the return
to workers savings) and the rate on bank loans (the cost of ¯rm debt), con¯rming the mutual
advantage for contracting by workers and ¯rms in imperfect ¯nancial markets.
We argue that the source of variation that identi¯es the e®ect of ¯nancial frictions on
the shape of wage contracts - di®erences across local markets in the change in ¯nancial
development induced by the liberalization of the 1990s - is arguably exogenous. First,
the liberalization process (prompted by the implementation of the II European Banking
Directive, mandating free entry in the credit market) is itself exogenous, being an external
shock imposed on the Italian credit market. Second, as argued by Guiso, Sapienza &
Zingales (2006), the liberalization process a®ects local markets di®erentially, not by design
but as a consequence of the di®erent degree of ¯nancial development that existed in the
initial period. Areas with more backward credit markets in 1990 naturally bene¯t more
from ¯nancial liberalization than areas that were ¯nancially more developed. Consistent
with this view, we ¯nd convergence in local ¯nancial development as liberalization runs its
course. Furthermore, the initial disparities in local credit markets are not the re°ection
of di®erent degrees of economic development but rather the re°ection of the heterogenous
impact of the 1936 banking regulation on local credit markets (Guiso et al. 2006).
Since the response of wage contracts to ¯nancial market imperfections should depend on
4¯rm and worker characteristics, we rely on observable heterogeneity to further corroborate
our ¯ndings. In particular, we ¯nd that ¯rms with plausibly more onerous access to the
loans market o®er steeper wage pro¯les than ¯rms with easier access to loans - conditioning
on being located in the same credit markets. This is consistent with the idea that the
former needs to rely on implicit borrowing from workers more than the latter. Similarly,
we ¯nd that workers who have presumably alternative means of consumption smoothing
(such as self-insurance through asset accumulation), as measured by education and age at
the time they start their tenure with the ¯rm, face a steeper wage tenure pro¯le in response
to ¯nancial market frictions than younger workers. This is in line with the idea that more
educated and older workers are less dependent on borrowing and are thus more willing to
implicitly lend to the ¯rm.
Several papers have studied the occurrence of lending within the ¯rm from a theoretical
perspective. Besides Azariadis (1988) and Michelacci & Quadrini (2005, 2009), , Bernhardt
& Timmis (1990) were among the ¯rst to formalize the idea, already noticed in Lazear
(1981) and Azariadis (1975), that ¯rms tied to workers by multiperiod relations can mediate
¯nancially when the latter cannot use human capital as collateral and are thus excluded from
credit markets. More recently, Burdett & Coles (2003) study a labor market where ¯rms
post wage-tenure contracts and show that in equilibrium wages increase with tenure and the
structure of the contracts re°ects both the workers preferences as well as the parameters of
market environment that ¯rms and workers face, including ¯nancial frictions. Our paper is,
as far as we know, the ¯rst to systematically undertake the empirical task of showing how
¯nancial frictions shape the wage contracts.1 More broadly, our paper is part of a literature
that studies the interrelations between credit and labor market imperfections (Wasmer &
Weil 2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates our empirical strategy
and reviews some of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and discusses
the sources of variation in local ¯nancial market development. Section 4 illustrates the
identi¯cation strategy behind our two-step estimator. Section 5 shows the estimation results
1Brandt & Hosios (1996), in a fascinating empirical contribution that uses data on wage/employers
contracts for some villages in 1936 rural China, where presumably ¯nancial markets were absent, show that
wage contracts do indeed generate lending, whose direction - from the employer to the worker or vice versa
- depends on preference parameters and the initial endowments of the two parties. However, in their paper
credit frictions are taken as given and are a realistic component of the environment. In contrast, our main
contribution is to establish how wage contracts respond to observed and measured developments in the
¯nancial markets that ¯rms and workers face in a modern economy.
5and Section 6 uses them to obtain estimates of the size of implicit lending within the ¯rm.
Section 7 concludes.
2 \Credit regimes" and Wage Tenure Pro¯les
2.1 Cases of Interest
To illustrate how ine±ciencies in local credit markets can a®ect (implicit) wage contracts,
consider the following (log) wage equation:
lnwij(p;t0)t = ½ + ¯Tij(p;t0)t + ±Lj(p;t0) + °Tij(p;t0)t £ Lj(p;t0) + "ij(p;t0)t (1)
for t = 1;2;:::;T. The actual wage equation we estimate below controls for a variety of
other characteristics, so here we use (1) just for illustrative purposes. The subscript j (p;t0)
indexes the ¯rm j (located in market p) that the worker joined in year t0, i indexes the
individual, and t indexes the current year. Here Tij(p;t0)t is tenure (hence Tij(p;t0)t = (t ¡ t0)),
and Lj(p;t0) is a continuous measure of the degree of ¯nancial market imperfection in the
area where ¯rm j is located. Without loss of generality, we normalize Lj(p;t0) = 0 in the
most developed credit market. We assume that the relevant credit market imperfection for
the wage contract set with worker i are those that prevail at the time of hiring; hence, we
do not consider the possibility of renegotiation.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible cases of interest. In the baseline case (Lj(p;t0) = 0) the
initial wage is ½ and it grows at rate ¯ per month of tenure with the ¯rm. The signs of ±
and ° determine the type of \credit regime" in which workers and ¯rms operate.
Consider ¯rst case I, in which ° < 0 and ± > 0; implying the wage pro¯le in more
backward credit markets is °atter than in more developed markets. Here, workers are
implicitly borrowing from the ¯rm. Their wage payments are front-loaded. This tilting
of the wage pro¯le may be interpreted as a response to credit market imperfections when
workers and ¯rms can establish long-term relationships through, for example, speci¯c human
capital investments. In a perfect credit market, individuals with the growing wage pro¯le
depicted in the baseline case would borrow from banks at the start of their relationship with
the ¯rm to smooth consumption intertemporally. However, acquiring reliable information
about aspects of the exchange relation between employer and employees may be costly
for banks, which respond limiting credit (in the extreme, denying access to it altogether).
Azariadis (1988) and Bernhardt & Timmis (1990) where among the ¯rst to suggest that
6in this case the ¯rm can act as a "lender of last resort" for its workers, implicitly lending
to them by o®ering a wage pro¯le that is °atter than in the frictionless case. In other
words, in underdeveloped ¯nancial markets consumption smoothing is achieved through
wage smoothing (or implicit borrowing), rather than through formal borrowing.
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There is an opposite view about the shape of the wage-tenure pro¯le, articulated in
Michelacci & Quadrini (2005, 2009). The intertemporal exchange may involve a liquidity-
constrained ¯rm implicitly borrowing from its workers. This can be achieved by back-loading
wages, i.e., paying lower wages at the beginning of worker-¯rm relationship (relative to the
frictionless case) in exchange for higher wages at a later stage. This corresponds to case II
in Figure 1. Here ° > 0 and ± < 0 and the wage pro¯le in less developed credit markets is
steeper than in more developed credit markets.
Which of the two \credit regimes" shape the wage-tenure pro¯le is an empirical question.
The answer depends primarily on the signs of ± and °. We estimate these two parameters
below using variation in access to credit in the location where the employment relationship
takes place. The estimation procedure allows us to distinguish between the two hypotheses
put forward in this section. Other confounding issues are discussed below.
2.2 Enforcement and Alternative Stories
What makes the contracts discussed above enforceable? Given that they involve implicit
promises, they are clearly not legally enforceable. However, as remarked by Azariadis (1988)
and Michelacci & Quadrini (2009), speci¯c human capital investments can be enough to
make these contracts self-enforceable, i.e., it is in all parties' interest to stick to them. In
case I workers have little incentives to quit if they have made ¯rm-speci¯c human capital
investments. In case II ¯rms have little incentives to ¯re the workers if they have made
worker-speci¯c investments. In both cases, reputational concerns may also facilitate im-
plicit contracts enforcement if the borrower's behavior is public information, a less obvious
condition.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the di®erence between the cases discussed in this section
and that studied by Lazear (1981), in which ¯rms tilt upward the wage pro¯le (relative to
the worker's productivity pro¯le) to reduce shirking and induce workers to exert the desired
amount of e®ort. If one assumes that in the baseline case wages coincide with productivity,
7it would appear that the ¯nding that the wage pro¯le is steeper in more backward credit
markets relative to the baseline (the empirically relevant case) can be made consistent both
with an incentive story µ a la Lazear and a liquidity-constraint story µ a la Michelacci-Quadrini.
Here, a few remarks are in order. First, in Lazear's case speci¯c human capital investments
are absent, and are in fact not even needed to make the main point. Second, it is true
that the ¯rm implicitly borrows from its workers at the beginning of their relationship, but
the borrowing is incidental (it is the only way to implement the incentive aspect of the
wage pro¯le) and it is independent of whether the ¯rm is liquidity constrained. Finally, in
introducing liquidity constraints in the model, Lazear assumes that ¯rms are unconstrained.
As stressed by Lazear (1981), "if workers have utility functions which are time separable
and concave in income, then the optimal [wage] path will remain upward sloping, even
if all borrowing is prohibited, but will tend to be somewhat °atter than it is when no
borrowing constraints are imposed [italics added]." We suspect that assuming that workers
are unconstrained while ¯rms are would give the opposite prediction.
While we cannot dismiss the idea that liquidity constrained ¯rms may tilt the wage
pro¯le upward for both liquidity and incentive purposes, we ¯nd it unlikely that incentive
considerations are the only ones that matter. As we shall, we can test whether the extent of
liquidity constraints faced by the ¯rm tilts the pro¯le even further. If we ¯nd that it does,
this provides prima facie evidence that borrowing frictions consideration are important.
3 Data
To identify the e®ect of credit market imperfections on wage contracts, one needs longitudi-
nal data on workers' histories with the ¯rms they have worked for, and local credit markets
that di®er in e±ciency. Italy o®ers both. Administrative data from the Italian Social Secu-
rity Administration allow us to obtain information on workers' earnings histories matched
with their ¯rms. Secondly, due to a number of "accidents of history" dating back to at
least the 1930s, the development of the Italian credit markets has di®ered markedly across
localities as small as provinces (the equivalent of a US county). As a consequence of these
initial disparities, the credit marker liberalization that has taken place over the 1990s has
di®erentially a®ected local credit markets. Hence, access to external ¯nance for workers
and ¯rms in di®erent areas di®ers greatly, di®erentially a®ecting their incentives to make
up for these ine±ciencies in the wage contracts. We illustrate in detail both data sources
8below.
3.1 Worker Wages and Firm Characteristics
We obtain wage data from the Italian Social Security registry (INPS) which provides infor-
mation on total compensation and its components for a sample of workers. The INPS data
are provided for the entire population of workers registered with the social security system
whose birthday falls on one of two randomly chosen days of the year (March 1th and October
1th). Data are available on a continuous basis from 1974 to 2002. The INPS, which cover
private sector employees (but not self-employment or public employment), derives from em-
ployer forms roughly comparable to those collected by the Social Security Administration
in the US.2 Mis-reporting is prosecuted. Besides providing information on workers earnings,
the INPS data contain also some demographics. However, as is typical of administrative
data, information on demographics is scant and limited to the age, gender, place of birth
of the worker, as well as his job positions (blue collar, white collar or manager), which we
take as a proxy for education.
For our estimates we restrict the sample to workers aged between 18 and 60 observed
over the years 1990-1997. We do not use data after 1997 because INPS switched to a new
data archiving system (from OM1 to SA770). We do not use data before 1990 because (as
we explain below) we do not have information on local credit market imperfections before
that date. However, we use the INPS data before 1990 to construct measures of actual labor
market experience and tenure with the ¯rm. Each record in the original data set is a social
security contribution record for a given worker/¯rm/year observation. For each record,
there is information about which month the worker was employed at that ¯rm. Apart from
self-employment or public employment spells, our measures of labor market experience and
tenure should thus be free from measurement error (at least for those observed after 1974).
Our initial 1990-97 sample is composed of observations with non missing social security
code, positive reported earnings, and consistent monthly employment codes. A worker may
have multiple social security contribution records in a given year (if, say, she had multiple
employers in that year). We drop those with multiple concurrent jobs (because moves are
hard to identify, those who receive social security contributions from a ¯rm after it goes
2While the US administrative data are usually provided on a grouped basis, INPS has truly individual
records. Moreover, US earnings records are censored at the top of the tax bracket, while the Italian data set
is not subject to top-coding.
9bankrupt (because it may signal a merger or acquisition rather than a closure, and those
who have spells at a given ¯rm separated by intervening spells at other ¯rms (because
the concept of tenure is not very clear cut. These selections reduce our sample to 513,624
records and 97,025 individuals. We drop individuals who have one or more outlier monthly
earnings records (a decline greater than 70% or an increase greater than 400%). We loose
35,759 records and 6,130 individuals. Since we need to estimate wage growth equations,
we also drop workers observed for only one year (15,596 records). Finally, we eliminate
records with missing information on the province of work, because we cannot match them
to information about local credit market imperfections (7,642 records). Our ¯nal sample
includes 454,627 records corresponding to 74,500 individuals.3
Since the INPS data provide us with the employer's tax code, we can match employees
with employers data from the Company Accounts Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci, or
CB for brevity). The CB data span from 1982 to the most recent years and give detailed
information on a large number of balance-sheet items together with a full description of
¯rm characteristics (location, year of foundation, sector, ownership structure), plus other
variables of economic interest usually not included in balance sheets, such as °ow of funds.
Company accounts are collected for approximately 30,000 ¯rms per year by the Service,
which was established in the early 1980s jointly by the Bank of Italy, the Italian Banking
Association and a pool of leading banks to gather and share information on borrowers. Since
the banks rely heavily on it in granting and pricing loans, the data are subject to extensive
quality controls by a pool of professionals, so measurement error should be negligible. While
the CB data are reasonably representative of the entire population in terms of distribution
by sector and geographical area (Guiso & Schivardi 2007), the focus on level of borrowing
skews the sample towards larger ¯rms: CB reporting ¯rms account for approximately half
of total employment and 7% of the number of ¯rms in manufacturing. For our purpose
perhaps the most important feature of the CB dataset is that it provides a credit score
measure of the ¯rm that banks use when screening ¯rms and allocating credit. As we will
discuss, this is a particularly attractive measure of ¯rm-level creditworthiness which will
prove useful when we look at heterogeneity in ¯rms' motives for relying on internal lending.
Apart from this, our main estimates do not need the merged sample and will thus be based
3Note that, given that mobility requires knowledge about current and past employers, the ¯rst observation
for each worker is lost and hence the probit regression in Table 1 uses only 379,785 observations. The wage
growth regression uses only 328,656 observations because it conditions on staying with the same ¯rm.
10on the non-matched data. Obviously, since our INPS data contains information only on
a sample of workers, when we merge them with the CB data we lose observations. The
matched dataset (with information on both worker and ¯rm characteristics) has 106,277
records, with information for 15,179 ¯rms and 24,639 workers (note however that some
¯rms have missing records on the credit score variable in some years).
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the sample of workers before matching with ¯rm
information (the "Whole sample") and after matching (the "Matched sample"). The two
samples are roughly comparable in terms of earnings and demographics (with the exception
of location in the South, which is under-represented in the matched sample). Average ¯rm
size is slightly smaller in the matched sample, but this is due to a skewness e®ect. Median
¯rm size in the matched data set is in fact almost ¯ve times as large as in the whole sample
(145 vs. 32).
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the sample of ¯rms [to be added].
3.2 Variation in Financial Development
To implement our test we need that ¯rms and their workers, though located within the
borders of the same country, have di®erential access to the loans market. Variation of
this sort may arise because credit markets are geographically segmented so that a worker
or a ¯rm located in a certain local market is bound to borrow in that market and local
markets di®er in their degree of development. There is ample evidence that ¯rms, particular
small businesses (and thus even more so, single individuals) are tight to their local credit
markets. For instance, Petersen & Rajan (2002), show that lending to small businesses
is a highly localized activity as proximity between the borrower and the lender facilitates
acquisition of information.4 Segmentation of local credit markets is thus very likely to
occur. Due to a number of historical legacies surveyed by Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales
(2004, 2006), Italian local credit markets traditionally di®er in their degree of development in
ways that are plausibly unrelated to di®erences in the level of economic development across
regions. AsGuiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2004, 2006) argue, there are at least two factors
that explain the di®erent degrees of ¯nancial development of Italian local markets. First,
4Bofondi & Gobbi (2006) show direct evidence of the informational disadvantage of distant lenders in
Italy. They ¯nd that banks entering in new markets su®er a higher incidence of non performing loans. This
increase, however, is more limited if they lend through a newly opened local branch, than if they lend at a
distance. Degryse & Ongena (2005) ¯nd that small ¯rms loan conditions depend on distance. Lerner (1995)
documents the importance of distance in the venture capital market.
11di®erent historical legacies and traditions have resulted in di®erent types of banks prevailing
in di®erent local markets. For instance, the Austrian in°uence until WWI, resulted in a
relatively stronger expansion of Savings Banks and cooperative banks in the North-Eastern
regions of the country, those under the domination of the Austrian Empire from where
Savings banks originated. Similarly, two of the major national banks (Banca Commerciale
and Credito Italiano) were the result of direct German investments in the most economically
advanced regions at the time (Lombardia and Liguria). Second, in response to the 1930-
31 banking crisis, in 1936 Italy introduced a new banking law, which imposed rigid limits
on the ability of di®erent types of credit institutions to open new branches and extend
credit. Each type of credit institution was assigned a geographical area of competence
based on its presence in 1936 and its ability to grow and lend was restricted to this area.
For instance, national banks could open branches only in the main cities; cooperative and
local commercial banks could only open branches within the boundaries of the province
they operated in 1936; while Savings banks could expand within the boundaries of the
region - which comprises several provinces - they operated in 1936. This regulation was
maintained virtually unchanged until the late 1980s. Since at the time these regulations were
enacted regions di®ered in the relative importance of the various types of credit institutions,
regulation ended up having a di®erential byte across di®erent local markets: some of them
were de facto given more freedom to develop than others.5
3.3 The Deregulation Process
This regulatory system was maintained almost unchanged until the late 1980s perpetuating
and actually amplifying the di®erences in ¯nancial development across local markets that
existed in the early 1930s. Hence when at the beginning of the 1990s a process of ¯nancial
liberalization was started, it displayed its e®ects on a set of heterogeneously developed local
credit markets. As a consequence of these di®erent initial conditions, ¯nancial liberalization
was relatively more bene¯cial to local markets that were lagging behind as of 1990. It is these
di®erential geographical e®ects of ¯nancial liberalization that we will exploit to identify the
5As Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2004) argue, these di®erential geographical e®ects of banking regulation
were unintentional and mostly the re°ection of di®erent degrees of political connections with the Fascist
regime. For example, the Fascist regime favored Savings banks because they distributed a substantial
amount of their net income to political organizations created by the Fascists, such as the Youth Fascist
Organization (Opera Balilla) and the Women Fascist Organization (OMNI). A second reason was the belief
that the 1930-33 disastrous banking crisis was mainly due to the insolvency of major national banks, which
created in the legislator a natural bias against large banks.
12e®ect of credit market imperfections on wage contracts. Before illustrating how we measure
them, it is useful to illustrate the liberalization process.
What triggered change was the process of European integration and in particular the
prospect of the application of the II European Banking directive, mandating free entry,
scheduled to be introduced in 1992. In anticipation of this change entry was entirely liber-
alized in 1990. In 1993 a new banking law (incorporating the Banking European Directive)
was approved. The separation between short and long-term lending (a feature of the 1936
regulation) was removed and all banks were allowed to underwrite security o®erings and
own equity. The same year the legal structure of Savings banks was changed. From mutual
organizations, they were transformed into standard corporations, facilitating acquisitions
and mergers. Finally, in 1994 the Government started to privatize all the major State-owned
banks. This process has resulted into a massive increase in entry into local markets with a
signi¯cant increase in competition (Angelini & Cetorelli 2003) which has resulted in a rapid
increase in credit availability and a decrease in the cost of funds (Casolaro et. al. (2006)).
At the same time and partly as a consequence of the lifting of limits to competitions, there
has been a signi¯cant process of banking consolidation which, at least locally, sometimes
may have resulted in an increase of banking market power, higher interest rates spreads
and lower credit availability to small businesses (Sapienza 2002, Focarelli & Panetta 2003)
which may have slowed down the e®ects of credit market liberalization.
3.4 Measuring Financial Development
A good measure of ¯nancial development would be the ease with which individuals that
need external funds can obtain them and/or the premium (adjusted for risk) they have to
pay for these funds.
To obtain this measure at the local level we rely on the methodology set forth by Guiso
et al. (2004, 2006). The central idea is to exploit geographic variation in access to the
credit market or in its cost to estimate the easiness that, otherwise equal ¯rms or workers,
can obtain lending in two di®erent local markets. Here we follow Guiso et al. (2006) and
use variation across ¯rms in the cost at which they can borrow to obtain a measure of the
e±ciency of the local credit market.6 In particular, we merge the CB data with data from
6GuSaZi04a rely instead on information on households that where turned down by a bank to obtain
a measure of ¯nancial development across Italian regions, which are larger geographical unites than the
province. In spite of the di®erence in the left-hand side variable, they ¯nd that the two measures of ¯nancial
13the Credit Register that we have access to7, to obtain for each ¯rm in the CB sample and
for all the years from 1990 to 1997 information on the interest rate on credit lines charged
by each bank that lends to the ¯rm. We than compute the interest rate spread with respect
to the rate on deposits in the province where the ¯rm is located to obtain a measure of
the mark up on loans and argue that banking markets that, ceteris paribus, charge larger
mark ups, are less ¯nancially developed. More formally, let sjbpt denote the the interest
rate spread paid by ¯rm j to bank b, in market p in year t , Fjpt a vector of ¯rm controls
and Bbpt a vector of bank controls. We run the regression
sjbpt = ¯Fjpt + °Bbpt + fpt + ´jbpt (2)
where fpt is a vector of province ¯xed e®ects that vary over time as a consequence of the
process of ¯nancial liberalization that has taken place over the 1990s. We than estimate
equation (2) for each year between 1990 and 1997, and retrieve the ¯xed e®ect fpt for each
one of the 95 provinces in which the country is divided. We than take fpt as our indicator
of ¯nancial backwardness. The implicit assumption is that the province is a proper proxy
for the relevant local market where the ¯rm (workers) can borrow. There are three reasons
why this is so. First, this was the de¯nition of local market that the Bank of Italy used
until 1990, when entry in credit markets was still regulated, to decide whether to authorize
the opening of new branches. Second, according to the Italian Antitrust authority the
"relevant market" in banking for antitrust purposes is the province. Third, the idea that
banking markets are de¯ned by close geographical boundaries, such as the province, is very
much consistent with distance being an important barrier to lending as re°ected in the
practitioners' view. As the president of the Italian Association of Bankers (ABI) declared
in a conference, the Italian banker's rule of thumb is to never lend to a client located more
than three miles from his o±ce, that is typically within the boundaries of a province.
To make sure that these province ¯xed e®ects do not re°ect borrowers' di®erences in
riskiness or di®erences across banks in the cost of making loans, we insert a number of
¯rms and bank controls. As measures of ¯rms quality we insert the ¯rm return on sales, its
leverage (as a proxy for ¯nancial fragility), its size (measured by log assets) which captures
the fact that smaller ¯rms are more likely to fail, and the ¯rm propensity score. For our
development are highly correlated, that is, in local markets where, ceteris paribus, it is more likely to be
turned down when applying for loans, the cost of a loan is higher when granted.
7Details on the matched CB Credit Register dataset can be found in Panetta, Schivardi & Shum (2009).
14purposes of controlling for ¯rm riskiness, the latter is a particularly important variable
which will also be used later. Firm score is directly computed by the CB in order to obtain
a synthetic indicator of the ¯rm probability of default. The important point is that this
score is than used by the banks that belong to the CB consortium to decide whether to
grant a loan and to price it. Thus, it is likely to capture most of the "hard" information on
which banks condition when assessing ¯rms' risk. Soft information is also probably relied
upon but is not observed by us.
Besides controlling for these ¯rm characteristics we also include several bank controls:
the size of the lending bank (measured by log assets), its return on assets, the ratio of non-
performing loans on total loans outstanding, and dummies for state or local government
bank ownership. These variables may a®ect the loan rate as they capture di®erences across
banks that are not picked up by the average deposit rate in a province. For example, state-
ownership of banks a®ect the lending rate, as state owned bank subsidize loans Similarly,
bank pro¯tability and non-performing loans a®ect the bank's cost of raising funds. Since
the same ¯rm often borrows from multiple banks (see Detragiache et. al. 2000), as an
alternative to these bank controls we insert a full set of bank dummies obtaining however,
very similar results.
Finally for each year in our sample we rede¯ne our indicator of ¯nancial backwardness
by transforming the measure of market power in the provincial local market as Lpt =
fpt ¡ min(fpt) so that the most developed (that is the most competitive local market) is
standardized to zero and the units of the measure of ¯nancial backwardness are deviations
of the interest rate spread from the province where it is smallest.8
Table 3 shows for each province in the sample the mean value of our measure of ¯nancial
market backwardness, the value in 1990 - the ¯rst year in the sample - and the change in the
indicator between 1990 and 1997 (our last sample year). There is ample variation across
areas with a clear geographical pattern that shows more ¯nancially backward provinces,
both at the beginning of sample and on average, in the Southern regions.9 This is more
8Notice that computing fpt ¡ min(fpt) for each year is e®ectively a way of detrending the data.
9Sicily is an exception as it shows lower values of the index of ¯nancial backwardness than other provinces
in the South. This is most likely a consequence of a di®erent regime of regulation that prevailed in Sicily
since the post war period, where the authorization to open new banks and new bank branches was granted
by the regional government rather than by the Bank of Italy. As a consequence, the number of local bank
branches over a 20 year period went up by 586% compared to a national average of 83 percent and the
number of banks went up by 21% while it was shrinking in the rest of the country. This is hard to explain
with an economic catching up but is consistent with the less stringent regulatory regime. At any rate,
15clearly visible in Figure ??, which reports the map of our average measure by province.
While a North-South divide is a clear feature of the data, there is considerable variation in
the degree of ¯nancial development within the Center-North and the South.
At the beginning of sample, before the liberalization process started, the least ¯nancially
developed province was Cosenza (in the Southern region of Calabria) while the most devel-
oped was Ravenna (in Emilia, one of Northern regions); the interest rate spread between
these two local markets was close to 400 basis points with a standard deviation across all
markets of 81 basis points, implying highly segmented local credit markets and substantial
dispersion in ¯nancial development. Di®erences across provinces in variation over time are
also very pronounced (third column) with a standard deviation of 71 basis points. This is
reassuring, since we will be using only the time variation in the degree of ¯nancial backward-
ness to identify its e®ect on wage contracts (see the next section for details). Interestingly,
provinces that were more backward just before the liberalization started are the ones where
the improvement in ¯nancial development has been more marked. This is consistent with
our contention that less developed markets bene¯t more from ¯nancial liberalization, pro-
viding the basis for our identi¯cation strategy. We document formally this convergence
induced by the liberalization process in Table 4 which shows growth-type regressions of the
change in ¯nancial backwardness between 1990 and 1997 on the initial value. The size of the
negative coe±cient on the initial level of Lp in column 1 implies that a province with a level
of ¯nancial backwardness that was one standard deviation above the mean in 1990 has ex-
perienced a decline in the interest rate spread by 40 basis points. To investigate further the
idea that heterogeneity across provinces in the e®ects of ¯nancial liberalization on ¯nancial
development is due to the di®erences in the level of ¯nancial development that prevailed
just before the liberalization started that were largely the unintended consequence of the
1936 banking regulation, in the second column we report IV regressions where the 1990
level of ¯nancial backwardness is instrumented with measures of the structure of the bank-
ing industry in the region in 1936, constructed by Guiso et al. (2004). The IV regressions
con¯rm the OLS estimates, showing convergence after liberalization.
excluding Sicily from our sample does not change the results.
164 Identi¯cation
To account for province e®ects both in the level of wage rates and in the returns to tenure
we expand (1) and rewrite it as:








+¹Eit + ¯Tij(p;t0)t + ±Lj(p;t0) + °Tij(p;t0)t £ Lj(p;t0) + (4)
´Tij(p;t0)t £ hp + hp + "ij(p;t0)t (5)
where hp is a vector of provincial dummies that capture di®erences in mean wages
across local markets and di®erences in the return to tenure when intercated with Tij(p;t0)t:In
particular, this formulation implies that any e®ect that di®erences in the average level of
¯nancial constraints have on the slope and the level of the wage contract are captured by
these two variables. Suppose that the structure of the error term in (1) is as follows:
"ij(t0)t = ai + bij(t0) + cit (6)
Here ai is an individual ¯xed e®ect (\ability"), bij(t0) is a ¯rm-worker match e®ect, and
cit is an i.i.d. shock. We could allow for the e®ect of time-varying ¯rm-speci¯c shocks (such
as in Guiso et al. (2006)) by appropriately re-de¯ning the term cit. The experience variables
are likely correlated with the error term. For example, more able people (people with high
realizations of ai) may have stronger labor market attachment and hence longer overall labor
market experience. Moreover, more experienced people may be in better matches because
they have had the opportunity to search longer while on the job. As for tenure, one might
expect ¯rms to ¯re less able workers more frequently than highly able workers. Moreover,
¯rms are more likely to ¯re (or workers more likely to quit) when the value of the match
is low. This discussion means that OLS applied to (1) will give biased and inconsistent
estimates.
Our identi¯cation strategy is very similar to that originally proposed by Topel (1994).
Let Mit be an indicator variable denoting whether the worker moves (if equal to 1) or
stays with the ¯rm (if equal to 0) between period t ¡ 1 and period t: Consider the ¯rst
di®erenced version of (1) for individuals who stay with the same employer between t ¡ 1
and t (Mit = 0). For these workers:














The advantage of this speci¯cation is that the sources of endogeneity (tenure and expe-
rience) have been removed. If ¢cit is independent of Mit (conditional on the observables),
then an OLS regression is all is needed to consistently estimate the parameters of (7), in
particular ° and (¹ + ¯). Note that ¹ and ¯ cannot be separately identi¯ed. If ¢cit de-
pends on Mit (even after conditioning on the observables), then this creates a standard
sample selection issue, which can be addressed making distributional assumptions about
the unobservable ¢cit and ¯nding an exclusion restriction for identi¯cation. Our exclusion
restriction is whether the current job is one found following exogenous displacement due to
¯rm closure. The idea is the following. Those who are displaced must start searching for a
new job \¯shing" from the unconditional distribution of match values. Those who moved
voluntarily to the current ¯rm did it because they improved their match value, i.e., they
\¯shed" from the conditional distribution. Hence, the probability of being a mover out of
the current job must be higher for the displaced workers than for the others.





0: Let us be clear about what this assumption entails. Since average wage growth in the
province is absorbed by the province dummies hp, what this assumption requires is that
shocks to the growth rate of individual wages, net of any common component, at any time
after the worker starts its tenure with the ¯rm are orthogonal to the degree of ¯nancial
development in the province where the job is located at the time tenure starts, Lj(p;t0):We
regard this as a very weak and reasonable requirement.
Identi¯cation of ° is all coming from variation in Lj(p;t0) over time and the fact that over
the sample workers start tenures in di®erent years. Intuitively, we pin down ° by comparing
the slope of the wage contract of a worker in province p who starts tenure with ¯rm j at
time t0 and both face ¯nancial constraints Lj(p;t0) and that of an otherwise equal worker
who starts tenure with the same ¯rm but at time t1 when both face ¯nancial constraints
Lj(p;t1) 6= Lj(p;t0):
10
10Since we can estimate the degree of local ¯nancial development only starting in 1990, for workers joining
the ¯rm before 1990 we assign the degree of ¯nancial development of the province in 1990. This assumption
is however consistent with our observation (see Section 3.2) that the structure of local banking market
18To obtain an estimate of the other parameter of interest - ±, the intercept of the wage-
tenure relation which turns out to be key for measuring the extent of borrowing that goes
on within the ¯rm - we use the estimates of ° and (¹ + ¯) from (7) to construct the residual
for individuals in their ¯rst job in the labor market: in this case, Eit = Tij(p;t0)t. We have:
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= 0, this regression can be estimated by OLS. However, one might
worry about the endogeneity of Lj(p;t0).
5 Results
Table 5, panel A shows the results of the estimates of the parameters in the ¯rst di®erence
wage regression on the sample of stayers, that is of equation (7). We control for worker
job position (dummies for blue and white collar) and for year dummies. The latter, in
particular, absorb any time variation in interest rate spreads over the sample period that
is due to nation-wide movements in interest rates. Furthermore, since we can identify the
e®ect of credit constraints out of province-speci¯c time variation, we can insert a full set
of province dummies as controls. Thus, any systematic di®erences across provinces (for
instance in average productivity) that is re°ected in wage growth is captured by these
controls. Without province-speci¯c time variation in ¯nancial development, identi¯cation
of the e®ect of ¯nancial frictions on wage contracts using only cross sectional geographical
variation in the level of ¯nancial development would be problematic; in fact, in so far as
¯nancial development also spurs, as it should, average productivity, it could also capture
di®erences in the latter on wage growth. This is not the case when using time di®erences
across provinces in the bite of ¯nancial frictions as the source of the time variation is the
exogenous liberalization imposed by the EU directive and because its heterogeneous e®ects
across provinces are the consequence of the di®erent initial levels of ¯nancial development,
themselves the accidental re°ection of the 1936 legislation as shown in Table 4.
has been frozen by the 1936 legislation, with little entry and expansion until the 1990s, with possibly the
exception of Sicily.
19The ¯rst column shows the results when no adjustment for sample selection is made. The
¯nancial frictions indicator has a positive and highly signi¯cant impact on a worker wage
rate growth implying that in areas with more backward ¯nancial markets ¯rms and workers
settle on steeper wage pro¯les over the job tenure. Ceteris paribus, this implies that in areas
where access to the credit market is more limited, workers will lend to the ¯rm, consistent
with the model of Michelacci & Quadrini (2009). Adjusting for selection (second column)
using the probit estimates shown in Panel B to compute the inverse Mills ratio results in a
much smaller coe±cient of the liquidity constraints indicator which however remains highly
statistically signi¯cant (p-value less than 0.01). The economic e®ect is also far from being
negligible: using this later estimate implies that moving a ¯rm and his workers from the
most to the least ¯nancially developed provincial market (using the 1997 estimates of L
) would, ceteris paribus, result in the ¯rm o®ering a wage-tenure pro¯le characterized by
about 1.32% higher monthly wage growth.
Hence, constraints in access to the ¯nancial market are partly compensated by ¯rms
and workers mutually agreeing to reshape compensation contracts so as to let funds °ow to
the agent that values their availability the most, in this case the ¯rm.
To fully characterize the e®ect of ¯nancial market imperfections on the shape of the
wage contract we also need to identify not only the e®ect on the slope but also its e®ect
on the location (the intercept) of the wage pro¯le. In fact, as described in Figure 2, if in
less developed ¯nancial markets workers lend to their ¯rm, the wage pro¯le should have not
only a higher slope coe±cient and also a lower intercept. Table 6 shows the results of the
estimates of equation (8); the ¯rst column uses the residuals using the estimates in the ¯rst
column of Table 5 panel A and the second the selection adjusted estimates. Consistent with
the previous ¯nding that ¯nancial backwardness makes the wage pro¯le steeper we ¯nd a
negative and highly statistically signi¯cant e®ect on the intercept of the wage pro¯le (the
parameter ± in equation (8)). Its estimated value implies that at the beginning of tenure
a worker matched with a ¯rm located in the median ¯nancially developed province (as of
1990) receives a wage that is about 36% lower than that obtained by an otherwise equal
worker matched with a ¯rm in the most ¯nancially developed province. Thus, by itself,
heterogeneity in access to ¯nance across ¯rms is su±cient to generate signi¯cant cross
sectional heterogeneity in observed wages paid by (otherwise) similar ¯rms to (otherwise)
similar workers. This helps address the wage heterogeneity puzzle documented among others
20by Krueger & Summers (1988), Abowd & Kramarz (2000)and Van den Berg (1999).
Of course, since the main e®ect of credit market imperfections is to twist the wage
pro¯le, this same worker will receive a higher wage at the end of his tenure. Hence, there
exists a value of tenure at which the wage in a ¯nancially developed market equals that
in a ¯nancially depressed market. Using (??) this value (which later we will denote T¤)
is equal to ±=°, i.e., about a tenure of 55 months using our estimates in Tables 5 and 6,
second column. Hence, during the ¯rst 4.5 years of tenure the worker is typically lending
to the ¯rm before starting being repaid back.
6 Heterogeneous E®ects as an Identi¯cation Device
The estimates in Tables 5 and 6 are consistent with the idea that the ¯rm can (partially)
circumvent imperfections in ¯nancial markets by appropriately modulating the shape of
compensation schemes to allow for intertemporal exchanges which are self-enforced thanks
to human capital speci¯city.
While we have argued that the variation in access to external markets we rely upon stems
from exogenous shocks, a skeptical reader may still object that even exogenous di®erences in
access to the loans market may result in di®erences in the workers' productivity pro¯le and
our regressions would be picking up the latter rather than borrowing and lending within the
¯rm. To wit, suppose that wage-tenure pro¯les vary systematically across areas because
borrowing restrictions change the incentives to invest in human capital, as in Azariadis
(1988). Even if ¯rms pay workers their current productivity so that there is no lending
within the ¯rm, we would be observing a correlation between our indicator of ¯nancial
backwardness and workers wage growth. We have two answers to this objection. First,
in order for our results to re°ect variation in productivity pro¯les induced by variation
in access to the loans market, it must be that productivity pro¯les are steeper in less
developed ¯nancial markets. Realistically, if either workers or ¯rms have a more di±cult
access to the loans market they will invest less in general and will also invest less in ¯rm
speci¯c human capital. Hence, workers pay pro¯les should be °atter, not steeper, in less
developed ¯nancial markets as less investment in speci¯c human capital raises productivity
and compensation today and depresses them in the future Azariadis (1988, p.517). Thus, in
so far as variation over time in access to the loans market has also a direct e®ect on workers
productivity pro¯les, our estimates are a lower bound of the e®ect of ¯nancial frictions on
21wage contracts.
A second way to address this issue and at the same time put to a farther test our
causal interpretation is to exploit compensation-relevant heterogeneity in workers and ¯rms
in their sensitivities to borrowing frictions. If a particular group of ¯rms (workers) that
we can identify is highly sensible to borrowing frictions - for instance because is highly
dependent on outside ¯nance or has no other source of external funds than bank borrowing
- we should expect, ceteris paribus, the wage contract to be particularly steep (°at) for the
workers (¯rms) in this group. This heterogeneity in the values of ° and ± is directly predicted
by the ¯rm-as-an-internal-credit-market model and can be used to strengthen/weaken its
empirical validity. In some cases what this model predicts is opposite to what one should ¯nd
if the correlations in Table 5 were due to di®erences in ¯nancial frictions causing di®erences
in workers productivity pro¯les and can thus be used to tell the two interpretations apart.
Here we focus on three sources of heterogeneity.
Firm creditworthiness. Firms in the same location with easier access to their local
credit market should be less in need of raising funds from their workers and thus be more
willing to accommodate workers borrowing demands. Hence, we should expect that ¯rms
with better access to their credit market o®er °atter wage pro¯les. We measure ¯rms
easiness in obtaining external funds with the ¯rm credit score. While often heterogeneity
in creditworthiness has been measured by the size of the ¯rm or its age (e.g. Kumar &
Francisco (2005) and the references therein), use of these variables was dictated more by
lack of better alternatives rather than by their intrinsic merit. In fact, both these measures
are likely to be poor indicators of creditworthiness as they pick up also may other features
that are correlated with ¯rm size and age and may also a®ect wage setting independently.
This is particularly important in our context, as size and age may, inter alia, pick up
di®erences in human capital speci¯city which may also a®ect the wage contract. In fact,
there is a large literature addressing the empirical regularity that large ¯rms pay higher
wages even after controlling for observable characteristics (see Oi & Idson (1999) for a
survey). The credit score allows to address this issue. This variable is directly available
to the banks that belong to the CB consortium and they condition credit extension to a
¯rm on its value. Hence, the score provides a measure of the creditworthiness of any ¯rm
on the same metric, whatever the age or size of the ¯rm. Consistent with credit scoring
measuring di®erences in ¯rms creditworthiness, we ¯nd that, ceteris paribus, high-score
22¯rms pay lower interest rates, as discussed in Section 3.4. Of course, since banks also rely
on "soft information" (private information not easily transferable to third parties, such as
the loan o±cer personal knowledge of the ¯rm) when extending credit, the credit score is
only a noisy indicator of the true ¯rm creditworthiness, which may give rise to attenuation
bias.
Finally, it is interesting to stress that under the skeptical view that ¯nancial frictions
a®ect wage pro¯les because they a®ect directly the workers productivity pro¯le, ¯rms with
bad scores should invest less in human capital and thus o®er °atter pro¯les than good
score ¯rms; this is the opposite prediction of what we should ¯nd if our results re°ect the
¯rm counteracting credit market frictions by distorting wage pro¯les relatively to tenure-
productivity pro¯les.
Worker di®erential access to the loans market. Following a similar logic we expect
that workers that have a harder time in borrowing in the local market should be less willing
to lend to their ¯rm (and may even borrow from it) and hence have a °atter wage tenure
pro¯le, that is smaller ° and (in absolute value) ±. For workers we do not have as good a
measure of their creditworthiness as we have for ¯rms and have thus to rely on a coarser
indicator. We proxy it with a worker job type using the distinction between blue collars,
white collars and managers and assume that access to the loans market is more problematic
for blue collars than it is for white collars and managers. This assumption is backed by
evidence from estimates of the conditional probability that a loan applicant is turned down
by an intermediary obtained using the Italian Survey of Households Income and Wealth
which shows that blue collars are signi¯cantly more likely to be denied credit than white
collars and manager11 Even so, we feel less comfortable in relying on this indicator than
when using the ¯rm score. Job quali¯cation, in fact, may capture other variables that may
give rise to heterogeneous reactions to ¯nancial market frictions. For instance, it may re°ect
di®erences in speci¯c human capital, though it is unclear whether blue collars bear more
speci¯city than white collars and managers. On the other hand, even if job quali¯cation
correctly re°ects heterogeneity in access to the local market, it may a®ect the pro¯le because
it a®ects workers investment in speci¯c human capital. In this case blue collars would have
11The Bank of Italy Survey of Households Income and Wealth, run biannually on a representative sample
of 8,000 Italian households contains information on whether a loan application was accepted or turned
down. We have pooled xx years of data and run probit regressions for whether an applications was turned
down controlling for demographics, measures of workers endowment, geographic and time dummies and
occupational dummies.
23a °atter pro¯le not because they are less willing to the lend to the ¯rm, but because being
able to borrow less in the market they are constrained in the amount of human capital
investment they can undertake. Hence this type of heterogeneity would not be helpful in
addressing the skeptical criticism.
Workers residual horizon. Workers with di®erent horizons with the ¯rm may have
di®erent incentives to enter into implicit intertemporal exchanges. Namely, workers who
start with a ¯rm but anticipate retirement very soon may be less willing to lend to the
¯rm than workers with many years ahead before retirement. In fact, for close-to-retirement
workers it may be di±cult to obtain repayment of what has been lent to the ¯rm at the
beginning of tenure and thus prefer °atter pro¯les (smaller ° and larger ±) Alternatively,
since borrowing needs vary over the life cycles and are stronger for the less experienced,
younger workers with longer horizons these workers could be less willing to lend and thus
obtain °atter pro¯les, a force that counteracts the horizon-length e®ect.To capture these
incentives we construct two indicators; the ¯rst is the number of years of experience, the
second the residual working horizon. Under our interpretation we expect that workers with
longer residual working horizons have steeper pro¯les (more negative ° ) and workers with
longer experiences have °atter pro¯les (less negative ° ) if the life cycle motive prevails over
the of being unable to recoup the loan.
Table 7 shows the results of the estimates when these interaction e®ects are added to
the estimates of the wage equation in ¯rst di®erences, i.e. equation (7). In each case we
re-estimate (7) by adding an extra interaction term between the indicator of local ¯nancial
frictions and the relevant measure of ¯rm or worker heterogeneity, controlling for any direct
e®ects that this heterogeneity may have on the wage setting. The ¯rst column shows the
results when we interact ¯nancial development with ¯rm credit score. We divide the latter
into three categories identi¯ed by three dummies: bad, medium and high score (the excluded
group). Controlling for any direct e®ect the score level may exert on workers wage growth,
we ¯nd that medium score and even more so bad score ¯rms o®er signi¯cantly steeper
wage pro¯les than high score ¯rms in the same local market. This implies that they raise
more funds from low-tenure workers in response to the imperfect working of their local
credit market than high score ¯rms. Quantitatively, a bad score ¯rm would respond to a
deterioration in the local credit market conditions by adjusting the steepness of the wage
pro¯le o®ered to its workers 1.2 times as strongly as an average score ¯rm and 7.7 times
24as a good score ¯rms which would o®er much °atter wage contracts. This result speaks in
support of the ¯rm-as-a credit market model and against the idea that our ¯ndings re°ect
e®ects of credit frictions on human capital accumulations.
The second column of Table 7 shows the results when the indicator of local credit market
frictions is interacted with the blue collar and white collar dummies, as proxies of workers
creditworthiness. Consistent with this interpretation we ¯nd that in response to ¯nancial
friction ¯rms o®er less steep pro¯les to blue collars (deemed to face more di±cult access
to the local credit market) than to white collars, and the latter in turn obtain less steep
compensation pro¯les of ¯rms managers (deemed to rank high in terns of creditworthiness).
For the three types of workers, the estimates of ° are 0:0006, 0:0037 and 0:0096 respectively,
showing substantial di®erences in the way the ¯rm designs the terms of the contract so as
to obtain more funds from those workers who have a higher propensity to lend.
The third and fourth columns show results when we interact the ¯nancial frictions
indicator with workers experience and residual horizon with the ¯rm, respectively. We
¯nd that in both cases, workers with shorter horizons, either because they have longer
experiences or because they are left with few years of work ahead, face steeper pro¯les than
workers with longer horizons. [Gino: I think we should add also an interaction with age in
these regressions; need to discuss this].
7 How large are credit °ows?
In this section we assess the size of the credit °ows within the ¯rm. We measure gross
lending as the savings on wage payments that a ¯rm facing a local market with ¯nancial
frictions obtains from workers with tenure T < T¤ (the tenure at which the worker begins
being repaid his loan) compared to being located in the most developed local ¯nancial
market. To construct a representative measure of credit °ows, we pool observations over all
available years to estimate the tenure distribution and average wages at each tenure within
each province. In what follows, therefore, we drop the time and individual subscript.12
From equation (1), given tenure T and wage wjT, in the most ¯nancially developed
12In fact, for many provinces we do not have enough observations to construct time-varying measures of
average wage by tenure and of the tenure distribution. Financial development must be measured at the
year when the worker entered the job. Given that we take the cross sectional average, for each province we
construct ¯nancial development for those with tenure T as the weighted average of ¯nancial development in




njT Lj(t0)t where njtT is the number of workers
with tenure T in year t and njT =
P
t njtT is the total number of workers with tenure T over the years.
25region the ¯rm would be paying the wage e¡(±+°Tj)LjTwjT so that borrowing from a worker






By construction, BjT is positive as long as T < T¤. It represents savings on wage payments
due to the di®erent tenure pro¯le compared to the province with the most developed ¯nan-
cial market. To compute the total stock of debt towards a worker with tenure T, note that
such worker has been lending to the ¯rm Bj0 in her ¯rst month with the ¯rm, Bj1 in the





CB reaches a maximum at T¤ ¡1, after which the ¯rm starts repaying the worker and BjT




To obtain a measure of total gross borrowing, consider a hypothetical ¯rm with a tenure
distribution identical to that in its province and normalize the total labor force of such ¯rm









where !jT is the share of workers in province j with tenure T. AB measures °ow borrowing
from the \average" worker. To obtain a measure of the stock of borrowing, recall that the
¯rm's borrowing from a worker with tenure T is CBjT. The total stock of debt for the





To obtain a comparable benchmark, we compute bank debt BD per employee. Given that
TB is computed for a hypothetical ¯rm with one (representative) worker, BD and TB are
directly comparable. We obtain information on bank borrowing from the the CADS data
13Given that we do not have a measure of the interest rate, we compute °ows without capitalizing them.
This implies that the numbers we obtain are lower bounds of the amount of lending from the workers to the
¯rms. We compute the implied rate of interest on credit °ows below.
26service.14 We take the average bank debt per employee at the provincial level, pooling
observations over the 1990-97 years, to which the worker data refer.
In Table 8 we report the results for the various statistics, focussing on the most backward
province (Cosenza), the one at the 75th percentile of the ¯nancial backwardness distribution
(Lecce), at the 50th percentile (Ragusa), at the 25th percentile (Trento). We also report
the cross-provinces average. For Cosenza, AB is almost 200 euros, approximately 28%
of the average wage in the province. Borrowing from the worker reaches a maximum of
almost 11,000 euros at tenure 54 months. CB is 2,676 euros, meaning that on average a
¯rm has almost 3,000 euros of debt per employee. Given that average bank borrowing per
employee is around 8,000 euros, this means that borrowing from workers is approximately
one third of that from banks. And since bank borrowing per employee in the most ¯nancially
developed province is approximately twice as large that of Cosenza, around one third of the
di®erence in bank borrowing between the most and the least backward province is made
up by borrowing from workers. As expected, the magnitude of the within ¯rm borrowing
°ows and stocks decreases with ¯nancial development. For example, in Trento, at the 25th
percentile of the ¯nancial backwardness distribution, CB is 1,371 euros, less than 10% of
loans from banks. The cross province average of CB is 1,604, around 10% of bank loans.
All the statistics computed so far only consider gross borrowing, that is lending from
workers to ¯rms over the tenure T < T¤. This does not consider \repayments" from the
¯rm to the worker, which occur when tenure T¤ is passed. If we impose the condition that
°ows to and from the ¯rm are actuarially equal, we can compute the internal rate of return
(IRR), that is the interest rate that makes the °ow of borrowing and repayments implicit










where pT is the survival probability, that is the probability that a worker is still attached
to the ¯rm at tenure T. This expression represents the NPV of the expected °ows to and
from the ¯rm.15 We ¯nd that the average IRR is 3.1%; but it varies across provinces: it
is 3.7% in Cosenza, 4.9% in Lecce and 2.4% in Ragusa and Trento. Ideally, IRR should be
14The CADS is likely to overestimate the amount of bank borrowing per employee, as only ¯rms with a
certain degree of credit worthiness are included. This implies that, if anything, the comparison between BD
and TB is biased towards ¯nding a more important role for BD.
15We are implicitly assuming that ¯rms and workers are risk neutral.
27above the interest rates that workers can obtain on their savings and below the interest rate
that ¯rms pay on bank loans.16 In fact, in the 1990-97 period, the cross-country average
real interest rate on loan was 10.1% and on deposit 0.6%; in Cosenza, they were 10.6% and
-0.2%, in Trento 9.9% and 0.92%. Our values are exactly within these ranges: both workers
and ¯rms bene¯t from transacting. An IRR of 3-4% indicates that the surplus is split but
the ¯rms appropriate a slightly higher share.
8 Conclusions
I8t has long been theoretically recognized that the relations that are established within
the ¯rm between workers on the one hand and capitalists on the other can go a long
way in tempering the e®ects of credit market and insurance market frictions - and even
provide a basis for the existence of the ¯rm (Bovenberg & Teulings 2002). Despite this,
very little progress has been made in pinning down empirically the importance of the ¯rm
as an insurance provider and as a credit market. Our previous work (Guiso, Pistaferri &
Schivardi 2005) shows evidence on the latitude of the ¯rm as an insurance market; this
paper shows how much credit can take place within the ¯rm and establishes that, at least
in the context of the Italian market, there is substantial lending °owing from workers to
¯rms, with the size of the loans proportional to the degree of the credit market friction.
This evidence is consistent with the assumption that the employment relation allows to
overcome some of the frictions a®ecting credit markets.
While we have focused on lending between the ¯rm and its workers, intertemporal ex-
changes within the ¯rms are probably more general. Firms can act as an internal ¯nancial
market not only by favoring exchanges across time and states between workers and capi-
talists but also among workers. In fact, the same repeated relation that facilitates ¯nancial
exchanges between the ¯rm and its workers, can promote borrowing and lending among
workers with heterogeneous consumption needs. We leave the study of this issue for future
research.
16Given that the repeated interaction between ¯rm and workers might allow for transactions that, due to
asymmetric information, do not take place in ¯nancial markets, the observed interest rate on loans might
therefore underestimate the shadow value of credit for a ¯rm.
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Table 1: Worker Characteristics
Mean Stand. dev.
Whole sample Matched sample Whole sample Matched sample
Monthly earnings (euro) 1486 1665 1055 1026
Age 37 38 11 10
Male 0.65 0.72 0.48 0.45
Productions 0.60 0.14 0.49 0.49
Clericals 0.39 0.38 0.49 0.49
South 0.22 0.14 0.41 0.34
North 0.58 0.69 0.49 0.46
Experience (in months) 116 137 81 81
Tenure (in months) 65 78 71 75
Mover 0.11 0.09 0.32 0.29
Firm size 2508 1654 12207 8589
Table 2: Firm Characteristics
32Table 3: Local Financial Market Backwardness
Province name Lp Lp;1990 ¢ Province name Lp Lp;1990 ¢
Agrigento 1.21 1.14 0.38 Messina 1.32 1.41 0.07
Alessandria 1.08 1.36 -0.79 Milano 2.06 1.84 0.21
Ancona 1.65 0.59 1.42 Modena 1.06 0.33 0.62
Aosta 1.31 1.38 -0.16 Napoli 3.31 3.30 -0.48
Arezzo 2.45 2.14 0.07 Novara 1.69 1.59 0.17
Ascoli 2.69 2.55 0.04 Nuoro 1.98 2.16 -0.13
Asti 0.63 0.84 -0.55 Oristano 1.71 0.61 0.83
Avellino 3.04 3.31 -0.14 Padova 2.20 2.17 -0.69
Bari 1.75 1.28 0.58 Palermo 1.55 1.45 0.40
Belluno 1.72 1.92 -0.90 Parma 0.41 0.20 -0.10
Benevento 2.89 3.74 -1.70 Pavia 1.43 1.46 -0.10
Bergamo 1.25 1.65 -0.72 Perugia 2.23 1.76 0.60
Bologna 1.07 0.76 0.11 Pesaro 1.48 0.04 1.86
Bolzano 1.44 1.32 -0.63 Pescara 2.18 1.95 0.22
Brescia 2.42 2.51 -0.68 Piacenza 0.81 0.54 0.10
Brindisi 2.42 2.24 0.49 Pisa 1.81 1.63 -0.65
Cagliari 1.75 1.58 0.08 Pistoia 1.78 1.63 0.10
Caltanissetta 1.39 0.96 1.41 Pordenone 1.97 1.64 -0.32
Campobasso 1.42 1.49 -0.90 Potenza 2.21 1.98 0.45
Caserta 3.33 3.57 -0.75 Ragusa 1.69 1.62 0.29
Catania 1.98 1.79 0.73 Ravenna 0.42 0.00 0.36
Catanzaro 2.18 3.05 -0.86 Reggio C. 3.02 2.46 0.70
Chieti 2.81 2.36 0.20 Reggio E. 1.23 0.79 -0.03
Como 1.92 1.90 -0.26 Rieti 2.38 2.26 -0.09
Cosenza 2.79 3.92 -1.74 Roma 1.78 2.06 -0.48
Cremona 1.64 1.41 0.21 Rovigo 2.02 2.40 -1.26
Cuneo 0.40 0.85 -0.85 Salerno 2.59 2.65 -0.18
Enna 1.56 0.66 1.71 Sassari 1.66 1.63 0.30
Ferrara 1.62 1.28 -0.05 Savona 0.61 0.74 -0.64
Firenze 1.74 1.40 0.73 Siena 1.53 1.50 -0.65
Foggia 1.30 0.98 -0.36 Siracusa 1.65 0.99 1.30
Forli 0.66 0.82 -0.29 Sondrio 0.59 1.61 -1.28
Frosinone 1.87 1.63 0.24 Taranto 2.73 3.42 -1.11
Genova 1.93 1.78 -0.14 Teramo 2.51 2.52 -0.52
Gorizia 2.18 2.32 -0.43 Terni 2.28 1.88 0.52
Grosseto 1.22 1.47 0.45 Torino 1.62 1.82 -0.67
Imperia 0.66 1.20 -0.54 Trapani 1.22 0.54 1.10
Isernia 2.99 2.73 -0.38 Trento 1.65 1.06 0.58
L'Aquila 2.26 2.03 0.18 Treviso 2.15 1.96 -0.46
La Spezia 1.64 1.60 0.14 Trieste 1.54 1.59 -0.26
Latina 2.43 2.51 -0.89 Udine 2.08 1.36 0.39
Lecce 2.40 2.10 1.32 Varese 1.91 1.78 -0.05
Livorno 0.79 0.73 0.41 Venezia 1.95 1.92 -0.20
Lucca 1.74 1.79 -0.39 Vercelli 2.23 2.37 -0.49
Macerata 1.64 0.60 1.79 Verona 1.98 2.05 -0.61
Mantova 0.63 0.87 -0.43 Vicenza 1.95 1.72 -0.18
Massa 1.34 1.27 -0.15 Viterbo 0.57 0.21 0.39
Matera 1.79 2.14 -0.33
33Table 4: The Convergence Process










34Table 5: Wage growth
Panel A:














¢Year dummies Yes Yes
Province dummies Yes Yes








Probit equation for worker mobility
Tenure ¡0:0024
(0:0013)


























Province dummies Yes Yes
N 51,343 51,343
36Table 7: The e®ect of ¯rm and worker characteristics













Liq. constr.£Bad score 0:0085
(0:0027)






Liq. constr.£Blue collar ¡0:0090
(0:0049)









Worker's residual work horizon
100 0:0128
(0:0010)
Liq. constr.£Worker's residual work horizon
100 ¡0:0015
(0:0005)
N 82,415 328,655 328,655 328,655
37Table 8: Credit Flows
AB MB CB BB CB/BB IRR
Most backward (Cosenza) 194.7 10928 2676 8120 0.33 3.7%
75thpct (Lecce) 120.6 6210 1670 5783 0.29 4.9%
Median (Ragusa) 89.5 5047 1239 11176 0.11 2.4%
25thpct (Trento) 91.3 5286 1371 16007 0.09 2.4%
Average 100 6224 1604 15321 0.10 3.1%
Note: AB average borrowing, MB is maximum borrowing, CB is cumulative borrowing, BB
is bank borrowing, IRR is the internal rate of return, that is, the interest rate that equalizes the
expected °ow of borrowing and lending.
38